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J.\par \par NEW-YORK:\par CHARLES SCRIBNER, 145 NASSAU-STREET.\par M.DCCC.LIV. \par ENTERED according to Act of Congress, in the year 1852, by JAMES W. ALEXANDER, in the Clerk\rquote s Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New-York. \par JOHN F. TROW, Printer & Stereotyper, 49 Ann-street. \par \par CONTENTS.\par \par \pard\fi-280\li280\sl240\slmult1 Chapter I. Conscience, or the Moral Faculty, 19\par Chapter II. The Moral Faculty, Original and Universal, 27\par Chapter III. A Moral Faculty Being Supposed, Whether its Dictates are Uniform, 30\par Chapter IV. How Far all Men are Agreed in their Moral Judgments, 85\par Chapter V. Whether Conscience is the same as the Understanding, or a Faculty Different from and Independent of it, 40\par Chapter VI. The Moral Sense Compared with Taste, 44\par Chapter VII. Moral Obligation, 48\par Chapter VIII. The Supremacy of Conscience, 60\par Chapter IX. Whether we Always do Right by Obeying the Dictates of Conscience? 64\par Chapter X. Whether there is in the Mind a Law or Rule, by which Man Judges of the Morality of Particular Actions? 73\par Chapter XI. The Moral Feeling which Accompanies Every Moral Judgment, 78\par Chapter XII. Belief in God, as Connected with the Operation of Conscience, 84\par Chapter XIII. Moral Agency, and What is Necessary to it, 89\par Chapter XIV. Man a Moral Agent, 97\par Chapter XV. Man not under a Fatal Necessity, 101\par Chapter XVI. Man\rquote s Direction and Government of his Actions, and his Consequent Responsibility, 107\par Chapter XVILVALI. Objections to the Uniform Influence of Motives, 117\par Chapter XVIII. Summary View of Liberty, 125\par Chapter XIX. The Kind of Indifference which has been Considered Essential to Free Agency, 182\par Chapter XX. Whether Men are accountable for their Motives; or whether Desires and Affections which precede Volition, have a Moral Character? 186\par Chapter XXI. The Division of Motives, into Rational and Animal, 141\par Chapter XXII. Whether Morality Belongs to Principles as well as Acts, or is Confined to Acts Alone? 147\par Chapter XXIII. Moral Habits, 155\par Chapter XXIV. The Nature of Virtue, 159\par Chapter XXV. The Nature of Virtue, Continued. Different Hypotheses, 171\par Chapter XXVI. The Nature of Virtue, Continued, 184\par Chapter XXVII. Whether Virtue and Vice Belong only to Actions? 199\par Chapter XXVIII. The Author of our Being Considered in relation to Moral Science, 209\par Chapter XXIX. The Phenomena of the Universe, 239\par Chapter XXX. Duties of Man to the Creator as thus manifested, 255 \par \pard\par \par \b PREFACE.\par \b0\par THE work now offered to the public is the last which proceeded from the lamented author\rquote s hand. In the days which immediately preceded his peaceful departure out of the present life, and while his powers were free from all clouds and weakness, he spoke of these papers as nearly prepared for the press, and consigned them with that intention to two of his sons. With a trifling exception, the whole had been carefully transcribed by the hand of filial duty from his own character, which, more from declining eyesight than any manual debility, had lost its former boldness and clearness, and had become difficult. In giving his commands respecting the printing, he empowered his representatives to use a discretion as to lesser points in the form, which has been found to be almost entirely needless.\par \par The ministers of Christ who in this and other countries remember the instructions of Dr. Alexander, will be best able to judge ofLVAL this production. They will recognise in it the doctrines and arguments which characterized the author\rquote s theological method, and will doubtless prize it as a comprehensive syllabus, even while they miss that copiousness, vivacity, and warmth, which added efficacy to his oral teachings.\par \par The subject of Ethical Philosophy may be said to have engaged the mind of the author for at least threescore years. The earliest vestiges of his boyish studies show proofs of this, in connection with the metaphysical inquiries which afterwards became his favourite employment of mind. Though in after years he was almost daily adding to his knowledge of ethical literature, with an avidity which was unabated to the last, and which sought to be satisfied with the most recondite disquisitions in the ancient tongues no less than our own, he nevertheless appears to have arrived at definite conclusions very early, and to have maintained them with little change. It was not the habit of his mind, as is well known, to accumulate authorities, to load his discourses with learned citation, or even to break the continuity of his analytical discourse by unnecessary sallies against opponents. Amidst a life of perpetual reading, of which he held the spoils in his memory with singular exactness and tenacity, he persevered in seeking and presenting truth with the minimum of quoted aid. This quality of his thinking will be all the rather obvious in a treatise like the present, which, as an epitome of extended results, necessarily leaves out a thousand particulars of the process and all the lighter play of illustration.\par \par During the period of nearly forty years, in which he was theological professor, the author had an exercise, for the most part weekly, in Mental and Moral Science; as a transition from college work and a recapitulation of juvenile studies. The lectures thus delivered were the basis of the succinct manual now made public. All its parts were thrown into a shape suitable for the printing, except theLVAL closing chapters on the Being and Attributes of God, and the duties resulting from the relation of the Creator and creature.\par \par These portions not having been copied remain in autograph, and may be regarded as the last written speculations of one who employed his pen almost every day for more than half a century. If the articulation of this important member with the body of the discourse seem less obvious than might be desired, it will become sufficiently clear to such as reflect on the great earnestness with which, in the former part. the author maintains the intuitive perceptions of conscience as independent of every doctrine of theology, even the greatest.\par \par A casual inspection will be enough to show any reader that this is a book of elements; laying down principles, clearing the statement of fundamental questions, and marking limits around the science. It does not descend therefore to the more usual and far easier work of gathering, naming, and tabling the human duties. This labour he did not undervalue; indeed it was part of his course of instructions; and his unfinished manuscripts contain large contributions towards a separate work in this kind, embracing even all the range of duties which are properly Christian and even ecclesiastical. But the treatise now presented was intended to lay foundations and elucidate principles; in other words it is upon the Philosophy of Morals. At the same time, however, that the topics here discussed are some of the most puzzling which have exercised human acuteness, patience and abstraction, from the days of the Greek authors till our own, they are such as cannot be set aside or turned over to others as matter for authority; for the very reason that they concern the springs of daily action, are presented every hour in the household, and meet us in the very babblings of the nursery. And notwithstanding the tenuity of the objects brought under review, and the delicate thread of inquiry along which the analysis must often feel its way, the writeLVALr seems to derive an advantage from his unusual simplicity and transparency of language, which might betray a superficial reader into the opinion that the train of argument is not original or profound. In none of the author\rquote s works is this quality more apparent than in that which follows.\par \par One of the reasons which impelled Dr. Alexander, at a stage of life which was encumbered with cares and infirmities, to address himself to this toilsome composition, was the desire to furnish a Manual for the young men of America, in our colleges, theological seminaries, and other schools. He was repeatedly besought to supply such a volume, and never wavered in his persuasion that it was necessary; especially when he saw with pain to what an extent the place of a class-book was occupied by the great but dangerous work of Archdeacon Paley. In common with other sound ethical inquiries he recognised the value of President Wayland\rquote s labours, and the eloquence and richness of Dr. Chalmers\rquote s striking but fragmentary contributions. Yet he thought he saw room for a brief hand-book level to the capacity of all; and he had a natural and pardonable desire common to all original thinkers, to give vent to his own opinions in his own order. In regard to the ethical system here expounded, the work may safely be left to speak for itself. It is positive and didactic rather than controversial, yet there is scarcely a chapter which, however tranquil and subdued in its tone, will not awaken opposition in some quarter or other. The polemic aspect of the treatise is, however, apparent only in cases where to avoid the naming of opponents would have been an affectation no less than a breach of trust. No one, whatever his private dissent may be, will justly complain that his opinions have been treated with unfairness or rigour. The connection of ethics with theology is such that no one can treat of the nature of virtue, of the will, of motives, and the like, without at least indicating his tendencies in regarLVALd to the great dividing questions of revelation; which only increases the necessity for giving the right direction to juvenile studies; unless we would receive to the professional curriculum minds already pre-occupied with ethical tenets subversive of great truths in law, politics and theology. Those who have watched the progress of modern speculation will not fail to apprehend the drift of this observation. Yet the way in which even these somewhat delicate parts of moral science are here set forth, is such as never to awaken suspicion of any sinister intention, or to betray any irregular passage into a neighbouring but separate science. Even those discussions which, at a first view, might seem to belong rather to natural theology, were deliberately assigned to their place after long experience in teaching, as pertaining to the limits where the two fields osculate if they do not cut, and with a clear pre-eminence given to the ethical side of the truths common to both.\par \par The labours of the author were arrested by his last illness, when the work here published was complete indeed as has been said, but not ready for the press in the sense of being revised and corrected. It is this which has made these prefatory pages necessary; an introduction from the author\rquote s hand would have precluded all such attempts as weak and impertinent.\par \par As he gave the work in charge with his dying lips, after having no doubt offered it to God in many of his solicitous and elevated thoughts during the preparation, so it is now humbly dedicated to Him, without whose blessing, no human effort, even in the best cause, is other than worthless.\par \par New York, Aug. 1, 1852. \par \par MORAL SCIENCE. \par \lang2058\f1\par \par \cf1\lang1033\fs22\par }  4N j ) " R Q c  >`'D\ Y06 Moral Sense compared with Taste|VJ30 Duties of Man to Creator֖H<29 Phenomena of the UniverseRJ>28 Creator in relation to Moral Science`T27 Whether Virtue and Vice belong only to actions?BSvj26 Nature of Virtue (conti)wwH<25 Nature of Virtue (Conti)jpH<24 Nature of Virtue(`i8,23 Moral Habits!f0$22 Morality belongs to Principles and Acts?(@ah\21 Division of Motives: Rational & Animal1]dX20 Are men Accountable for their motives?&ZdX19 Indifferene essential to Free Agency8"W`T18 Summary View of LibertyN3SF:17 Objections to Uniform Influence of MotivesBNl`16 Man's Government of Actions & Responsibility SHpd15 Man not under a Fatal Necessity2DVJ14 Man a Moral Agent!A:. 13 Moral Agency, What's Necessary?==VJ 12 Belief in God, Operation of Conscience):dX 11 Moral Feeling with Moral JudgmentX-7ZN 10 Is there a Law to judge morals?d'4VJ 09 Is Obeying Conscience always right? I/^R08 Moral Obligation-8,07 Moral Obligationa&8,05 Is Conscience same as Understanding?@$`T04 How Far all Men are Agreed in Moral JudgmentsB#!rf03 Moral Faculty Being Supposed Uniform Dictates)rf02 Moral Faculty, Original and Universal.bV01 Conscience, or the Moral Faculty>XL00 Alexander - Outlines in Moral Science]bVLVAL{\rtf1\ansi\ansicpg1252\deff0{\fonttbl{\f0\froman\fprq2\fcharset0 Georgia;}{\f1\fnil\fcharset0 Georgia;}} {\colortbl ;\red0\green0\blue0;} {\*\generator Riched20 5.40.11.2210;}\viewkind4\uc1\pard\lang1033\f0\fs24 CHAPTER I.\par CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL FACULTY.\par \par As all men, when reason is developed, have a faculty by which they can discern a difference between objects of sight which are beautiful and those which are All men discern moral qualities deformed, so all men possess the power of discerning a difference between actions, as to their moral quality. The judgment thus formed is immediate, and has no relation to the usefulness or injuriousness to human happiness, of the objects contemplated.\par \par Whatever difference of opinion may exist respecting the origin of this faculty, it is universally admitted that men, in all True in all ages ages and countries, have judged some actions to be good and deserving of approbation, while they have judged others to be bad, and of ill desert.\par \par In all languages, we find words expressive of the ideas of moral excellence, and moral evil. In the laws and penalties established in all ages throughout the Agreement of mankind world, it is evidently implied that some actions ought to be done, and others avoided. In cases of flagrant injustice or ingratitude, all men, of every country and of every age, agree in their judgment of their moral evil. There is, in regard to such actions, no more difference in the judgment of men, than respecting the colour of grass, or the taste of honey. If any man does not perceive grass to be green, or honey to be sweet, we do not thence conclude that men\rquote s bodily senses are not similarly constituted, but that the organs of the individual who does not see and taste as other men do, are defective or depraved by disease.\par \par Case proposed must be simple. To determine whether all men have one original moral faculty, the case proposed for their moral judgment should be simply good or evil. For a LVALcomplex act, in which there is something good and something evil, or rather where there must be an accurate weighing of motives in order to ascertain the quality of the action, is not a proper test as to the existence of a uniformity of moral judgment in men. Therefore, the historical fact adduced by Dr. Paley, [1] from the history of Valerius Maximus, is not at all suited to his purpose; Case of Toranius irrelative. because the case is very complex, and one on which it is difficult to determine at first view, what the true moral character of the action is. The facts, as related by him, are as follows: The father of Caius Toranius had been proscribed by the Triumvirate. Caius Toranius\emdash coming over to the interests of that party\emdash discovered his father\rquote s place of concealment to the officers who were in pursuit of him, and gave them, withal, a description of his person by which they might distinguish him. The old man, more anxious for the safety and fortunes of his son than for the little that might remain of his own life, began immediately to inquire of the officers whether his son were well, and whether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of the generals. \lquote That son (replied one of the officers), so dear to thy affections, has betrayed thee to us; by his information thou art apprehended, and diest.\rquote With this, the officer struck a poniard to his heart, and the unhappy parent fell, affected not so much by his fate, as by the means to which he owed it.\rdblquote Now, the question is, if this story were related to the wild boy caught some years ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without experience and without instruction, cut off in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and consequently under no possible influence of example, authority, education, sympathy, or habit, whether or not such a one would feel upon the relation any degree of that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius\rquote s conduct which we feel.\par \par Why it affords no criterLVALion. In our judgment, such a case would afford no criterion by which to determine whether men possess constitutionally a moral sense. For, in the first place, the trial would be no better than if the question were proposed to a child two years old, in whose mind the moral faculty is not yet developed. A human being, arrived at adult age without instruction or communication with others, would be\emdash as it relates to the mind\emdash in a state differing very little from that of infancy. It is not held that the moral sense will be exercised without the usual means by which human faculties are developed. If an organical defect in the brain should prevent the intellectual faculties from coming into exercise, the unhappy individual thus deprived of reason would prove nothing in regard to the operations of reason where it is developed. So, also, if a human being were brought up from early infancy in a dark dungeon, and if no information were communicated to him, the mental faculties would not be developed, and it would be absurd to have recourse to such a one to ascer tain what faculties belong to the human mind. The same remark will apply to the case of the wild boy, referred to by Dr. Paley; and also, though in an inferior degree, to savages of the most degraded class.\par \par What is meant by an original, universal faculty. Let it then be fairly understood what it is which is asserted in regard to conscience, as an original, universal faculty. It is What is meant by that every human mind, when its faculties have been developed, and have arrived at some degree of maturity, discerns a quality in certain actions which is termed moral; that is, it intuitively perceives that some actions are right and some wrong.\par \par Paley\rquote s instance complex. Another objection to the historical fact adduced by Dr. Paley, is, that it presents to the mind, not a case of simple, unmixed good or evil, but a complex case, in which\emdash before a judgment can be formed of the action of the son\emdash it must bLVALe decided whether a man ought to be governed by a regard to the welfare of a parent, or to the public good. If the son believed that the party in pursuit of his father was promoting the public good, he might feel that he ought to be governed by this rather than by filial affection. Here, then, we have presented a complex and difficult case in morals, about which men would be very apt to differ; and we are to determine whether all men\emdash even those totally uneducated\emdash would view it in the same light.\par \par A proper case supposed. To render the case a suitable one to be a test of the question under consideration, it should be supposed that the father was acting in conformity with the strictest principles of rectitude; that his life was sought by wicked men, aiming not at the good of the commonwealth but its destruction; and that the son, in betraying the place of his concealment, was actuated by mercenary motives, or by unjust and unnatural dislike to a good parent. If a case like this were presented to a thousand persons from as many different parts of the world, there would be but one judgment and one feeling, all would judge the conduct of the son to be blamable. Different degrees of moral disapprobation would be felt by those whose moral faculty was in a cultivated state; but there would be no difference in the opinion entertained of his conduct. All would feel disapprobation, accompanied by a desire for the punishment of the offender. It is found that savages appear to have but an obscure exercise of conscience, but in proportion as their minds are cultivated, this faculty becomes more manifest, and operates more forcibly. \par \par [1] In the chapter of his Moral Philosophy, under the head \ldblquote The Moral Sense.\rdblquote \par \par \lang2058\f1\par \cf1\fs22\par } LVAL{\rtf1\ansi\ansicpg1252\deff0{\fonttbl{\f0\froman\fprq2\fcharset0 Georgia;}{\f1\fnil\fcharset0 Georgia;}} {\colortbl ;\red0\green0\blue0;} {\*\generator Riched20 5.40.11.2210;}\viewkind4\uc1\pard\lang1033\f0\fs24 CHAPTER II.\par \par THE MORAL FACULTY, ORIGINAL AND UNIVERSAL.\par \par Moral ideas otherwise unattainable. IF conscience were not an original faculty, enabling us to form a conception of moral qualities, man could never acquire such an idea by any other means. The opinion, therefore, that moral feelings are merely the effect of instruction and education, is erroneous. For every class of simple ideas there must be an appropriate faculty, without which these ideas can never be acquired. In regard to the bodily senses, this is too evident to be called in question. Without the organ of vision, the simple idea of light and colours could never be communicated by any instructions; without the organ of hearing, no idea of sound can be conveyed; and so of the other senses. And it is equally true of that knowledge which is acquired by what some have called the internal senses. If there were in man no such faculty as taste, by which beauty is perceived, no idea of the beautiful could possibly be communicated. A horse has no perception of the beauty of a scene which perhaps enchants his rider, even though the animal sees all the objects with equal distinctness. So it is in regard to moral qualities. There must be an original faculty to give us the simple idea which we have of morality; otherwise the idea of virtue or vice could never have entered the human mind, and the feelings of moral obligation, of which all men are conscious, would never have been felt.\par \par The utilitarian objection. I am aware that those who advocate the utilitarian scheme, resolve all our ideas of morality and moral obligation into the mere principles of benefit or injury, apprehended to be connected with each action. Dr. Paley informs us, that the subject continued to be involved in impenetrable mystery, until hLVALe took this view of it.\par \par It is deemed useless to argue this point; it cannot be decided by reasoning. The appeal must be made to the consciousness of every man.\par \par Appeal to consciousness. If any one persists in declaring that he sees no evil in any action but as it is evidently detrimental to human happiness, nothing can be said in the way of argument to alter convictions derived from his own consciousness. All that is proper to be said is, that the mind of such a person is differently constituted from that of most men; or rather that an impartial examination of this subject has not been made. It is recommended to such persons carefully to scrutinize the exercises of their own minds; they will perceive that the idea of virtue or moral good is entirely distinct from that of mere utility. There is, indeed, a connection between these two things which is very intimate, and this seems to have misled many in their judgments. Virtuous conduct leads to happiness, and is always beneficial; yet our idea of its moral character is not derived from this consideration, but from the nature of the action itself. \par \lang2058\f1\par \cf1\lang1033\fs22\par } LVAL{\rtf1\ansi\ansicpg1252\deff0{\fonttbl{\f0\froman\fprq2\fcharset0 Georgia;}{\f1\fnil\fcharset0 Georgia;}} {\colortbl ;\red0\green0\blue0;} {\*\generator Riched20 5.40.11.2210;}\viewkind4\uc1\pard\lang1033\f0\fs24 CHAPTER III.\par \par A MORAL FACULTY BEING SUPPOSED, WHETHER ITS DICTATES ARE UNIFORM?\par \par Objection from alleged disagreement. ONE of the strongest objections which has been brought against the doctrine laid down is, that among men of different countries, and of entirely different education, there is no agreement in their judgments respecting the morality or immorality of the same actions. Whereas, it is alleged, that if such a faculty were originally a part of man\rquote s constitution, there would as certainly be uniformity, as in the perception of objects by the external senses. Now, if the dictates of conscience in men of different ages and countries do so much differ, does it not show that the moral feelings of men are just what education makes them? And what is gained by maintaining the existence of a moral faculty, as part of man\rquote s original constitution?\par \par Moral differences perceived by all. It will, I think, be admitted, that in all countries and conditions in which men have been found, there exists a perception of a difference in the moral character of actions; that is, some things are accounted wrong, which ought not to be done, and some right, which ought to be done.\par \par Total disagreement not pretended. Again, it has never been pretended as being a matter of fact, that between men of different countries there is a total difference in the opinions entertained respecting what is right and what is wrong. A few cases only of difference are alleged, in which this discrepance is observed; but in regard to those actions which are reckoned good or evil, there is a general agreement. As to those in which there seems to be a fundamental difference, an explanation will be given hereafter. No nation, or tribe, or class of mankind has ever held that it iLVAL s a virtuous and proper thing to do injury to men, or that there is no more harm in taking away life than in preserving it. It has never been held that ingratitude\emdash though everywhere common in practice\emdash is a commendable thing; or that deceit and fraud are as praiseworthy as honesty and fair dealing.\par \par Proof from common estimate of character. There is in every country a difference made in the estimation of the character of men, derived from the course of their conduct. Some men are reckoned good in the public estimation, while others are considered wicked; the former obtain esteem, the latter are despised. That course of conduct which secures a good reputation, does not in any country consist of actions which we consider wicked, but of actions which in all countries are considered praiseworthy; and men have never obtained a bad character by a course of good behaviour.\par \par Practice does not prove absence of moral judgment. It is also important to observe, that the conduct of a people is not a fair test of the internal state of the mind, as it relates to morals. We know that individuals often pursue a course of conduct, which in their serious moments they condemn. Yet the power of temptation, and the habit of indulgence are such, that notwithstanding the convictions of conscience, they continue in a course of evil-doing. It would be a very inconclusive inference to determine from their habitual conduct, that they acted in accordance with the dictates of conscience. And what is true of individuals, may be true of nations and tribes. Those customs which they have received from their forefathers, may not meet with the approbation of their moral sense, and yet such is the force of an established custom, that they go on in the way in which they were brought up.\par \par Error is in the applic